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Abstract
We use novel data to show that the beauty wage premium exists only in jobs where attrac-
tiveness is plausibly a productive characteristic. A large premium exists in jobs that require
substantial amounts of interpersonal interaction, but no such premium exists in jobs that
require working with information and data. This is inconsistent with employer taste-based
discrimination, which would favor attractive workers in all jobs. Our unique task data address
concerns that measurement error in the importance of interpersonal tasks may bias results to-
wards employer discrimination. Our conclusions are in stark contrast to all previous research
that uses a similar approach.
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1 Introduction
It is now well-established that physically attractive workers tend to earn higher wages than less
attractive workers (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998; Harper, 2000;
Robins et al., 2011; Scholz and Sicinski, 2015). From the standpoint of considering the merits
of potential policy related to this finding, a crucial first step involves understanding the extent
to which the attractiveness premium arises because of employer taste-based discrimination of
the type described by Becker (1957). If such discrimination is present, then legislating away pay
differences based on attractiveness has a fundamental anti-discriminatory appeal.1 However,
whether the net benefits of such legislation are positive is less obvious if the premium arises
for other reasons. For example, if attractive workers are simply more productive in certain jobs,
then removing the incentive to sort into jobs on the basis of this particular characteristic might
negatively affect overall worker-employer match quality. Moreover, an unintended inequity could
arise because some individuals (e.g., those with high cognitive ability) would be allowed to take
full of advantage of their most productive attributes while others (e.g., attractive workers) would
not.
In this paper, we provide new evidence about the labor market mechanisms generating the
beauty premium using novel data from the Berea Panel Study. These data contain measures
of physical attractiveness along with unique information about the type of job tasks that indi-
viduals perform. We provide new evidence that the beauty premium varies widely across jobs
with different task requirements. Specifically, in jobs where existing research such as Hamer-
mesh and Biddle (1994) has posited that attractiveness is plausibly a productivity enhancing
attribute—those that require substantial amounts of interpersonal interaction—a large beauty
premium exists. In contrast, in jobs where attractiveness seems unlikely to truly enhance pro-
ductivity—jobs that require working with information and data—there is no beauty premium.
This stark variation in the beauty premium across jobs is inconsistent with the employer-based
discrimination explanation for the beauty premium, because this theory predicts that all jobs will
favor attractive workers. Moreover, we provide strong evidence that physically attractive work-
ers sort into jobs where beauty is valued, just as theory would predict for any other productive
1Hamermesh (2011) describes localities, such as Washington D.C., where some form of this type of legislation
exists.
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attribute. Taken together, the results suggest that beauty should perhaps be simply viewed as a
productive attribute that is highly valued in certain jobs.
While our results are consistent with the notion that a profit motive may serve as a “natu-
ral antidote” to employer taste-based discrimination based on beauty (Mankiw, 2015), they are
in stark contrast to past empirical work involving longitudinal surveys, which has consistently
concluded that this type of discrimination is of central importance. For example, in their seminal
work Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) find that “The strongest support is for pure Becker-type
discrimination based on beauty and stemming from employer/employee tastes.” Similar conclu-
sions are reached more recently by Harper (2000), who finds that “The bulk of the pay differential
for appearance arises from employer discrimination...,” and by Scholz and Sicinski (2015), who
find that the substantial overall beauty premium “is not solely driven by greater productivity,
leaving a role for taste-based discrimination...”
In considering why our findings deviate substantially from previous work, it is worth noting
that one gets a sense of some reluctance in this previous work to view currently available evi-
dence in favor of employer discrimination as the final word on the subject. As is the case in this
paper, empirical tests in past work are based on the insight that employer taste-based discrimina-
tion would produce beauty premiums across all types of jobs, while a worker productivity-based
explanation would produce beauty premiums in only a subset of jobs: those jobs where the
presence of substantial interpersonal interactions provides an opportunity for attractiveness to
potentially enhance worker productivity. Unfortunately, accurately characterizing the amount
of interpersonal interaction on one’s job is a major challenge using standard survey data.2 This
is critical because measurement error introduced during this characterization likely creates an
attenuation bias that works in favor of an employer discrimination conclusion, by making it dif-
ficult/impossible to detect the scenario where a beauty premium exists only in a predetermined
subset of jobs where attractiveness potentially enhances worker productivity. Perhaps this empir-
ical difficulty served as motivation for Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) to reexamine their earlier
conclusions obtained from general longitudinal surveys, finding some evidence inconsistent with
employer discrimination in a sample of attorneys.3
2A growing literature has demonstrated the value of task-based approaches to classifying jobs, although not in
the context of the attractiveness wage premium. See, for example, Poletaev and Robinson (2008), Gathmann and
Schönberg (2010), Sanders and Taber (2012), Yamaguchi (2012, 2016), Sanders (2014), Lise and Postel-Vinay (2015),
Speer (2016), and Roys and Taber (2016).
3Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) find that the beauty premium is no smaller for self-employed attorneys than it is
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While our access to college ID pictures allows our attractiveness measures to share the virtues
extolled in Scholz and Sicinski (2015) and while our data contain necessary, detailed wage in-
formation, our primary motivation for taking a fresh look at the employer discrimination issue
comes from our access to unique data describing the tasks performed on jobs.4 From the stand-
point of identifying the set of jobs where attractiveness may be productivity enhancing, the task
data represent a critical advance for two related reasons: 1) they represent the only longitudinal
data in which job tasks are measured directly for a worker’s actual job and 2) they are unique in
containing explicit time allocation information, which produce quantitative task measures that
are easily interpretable and conceptually appealing. The importance of 1) stems from the fact
that, in order to characterize the work that a person performs on her actual job, general longitu-
dinal surveys typically provide, at most, the occupation to which the job belongs. This implies
that the tasks associated with the person’s actual job must be imputed using information about
what is “typical” in the occupation from external (occupation-level) data sources such as the Dic-
tionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). However, recent evidence that variation in tasks tends to be
large within occupations implies that this imputation can create substantial measurement error
(Autor and Handel, 2013; Robinson, 2011). In our substantive context, the concern is that many
jobs requiring substantial interpersonal interactions may be present even in occupations where
the median, modal, or average amount of interpersonal interaction is not particularly large.
The importance of directly measuring time spent on job tasks arises because the nature of the
information provided in external sources such as the DOT can make it challenging to partition
the set of occupations into those where attractiveness potentially enhances worker productivity
and those where attractiveness seems unlikely to enhance worker productivity. As an example,
consider the fifth digit of the DOT code that is used in Hamermesh and Biddle (1994). This digit
identifies the highest level of People tasks that is typically required in an occupation, with all
occupations being assigned a level from a list consisting of mentoring, negotiating, instructing,
for other types of attorneys.
4Investigations into the role of beauty in the labor market have been hampered by a dearth of datasets that
contain measures of beauty. Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) find that only three North American datasets include
both measures of beauty and labor market information: the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey, the 1971 Quality of
American Life Survey, and The 1981 Canadian Quality of Life Study. Scholz and Sicinski (2015) uses the Wisconsin
Longitudinal Study, which surveyed students from the high school class of 1957 and Harper (2000) uses the British
longitudinal cohort data of students from the high school class of 1958. The Add Health data used in Mocan and Tekin
(2010) is the only relatively recent North American longitudinal survey that includes attractiveness measures. In these
data, measures of beauty are typically based on an assessment by a single data collector. The use of the Wisconsin
Longitudinal Study in this context was made possible by an ambitious, recent yearbook collection initiative.
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supervising, diverting, persuading, speaking, serving, and following instructions. The empirical
challenge arises because, while the list is ordered from the highest skilled task to the lowest
skilled task, theory does not provide guidance about whether this is the correct order when the
objective is to predetermine the set of jobs where beauty is potentially productive. For example,
if beauty affects productivity by facilitating communication, symmetric effects of beauty might
be expected for those giving instructions (third highest skill) and those following instructions
(lowest skill), and it also seems quite possible that a server (second lowest skill) will benefit as
much from beauty as a manager who spends time mentoring or negotiating (the first and second
highest skills). Further ambiguity about the correct task order in this context arises because there
is no theoretical reason that the time spent on interpersonal interactions must increase as the level
of People tasks increases across the skills in the list above, and the DOT provides no information
about time allocation that could be used to examine whether this is the case.5
Our primary contribution is showing that the collection and use of conceptually appealing
task measures leads to much different conclusions about the importance of employer discrim-
ination on the basis of attractiveness than have been reached in the past. We stress that our
approach is relevant for studying the issue of attractiveness, but provides no evidence about the
importance of discrimination on the basis of race or other characteristics (see, e.g., Black, 1995,
Neal and Johnson, 1996, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004, Charles and Guryan, 2008, 2009). The
key difference is that, in the context of testing for discrimination based on attractiveness, it seems
reasonable to posit a certain set of jobs where attractiveness might be productive.
As with previous research in this area, it is not our objective to make specific policy prescrip-
tions. One reason for this is that, while we do focus on understanding the importance of employer
preference-based discrimination, it would perhaps never be possible to conclusively rule out all
other, sometimes subtle, potential sources of discrimination. For example, for convenience we
refer to the primary alternative to an employer preference-based discrimination explanation as a
worker productivity explanation. However, although our unique data allow an opportunity to
identify assumptions under which we can differentiate between this explanation and a customer
5Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) form two groups: 1) those whose highest level is receiving instructions and 2)
everyone else. Highlighting the difficulty of the measurement challenge, they also try two other approaches for par-
titioning occupations: 1) soliciting the opinions of eight adults about the importance of attractiveness in occupations
and 2) taking advantage of a survey in which employers were asked whether an applicant’s appearance was an
important consideration in filling the most recent job vacancy.
4
preference-based discrimination explanation, in general making this distinction is difficult for
both conceptual and empirical reasons. It is also possible that our results are consistent with
a scenario in which employers unintentionally discriminate because they have incorrect views
about the productivity of attractiveness in jobs that require a large amount of interpersonal in-
teraction (see, e.g., the experimental work of Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006, and Deryugina and
Shurchkov, 2015), although access to longitudinal data can provide some evidence against this
possibility if one believes that employers eventually learn the productivity of their workers.6 7
As has been frequently recognized, attractiveness may be correlated with other cognitive or
non-cognitive traits that influence wages (Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006; Deryugina and Shurchkov,
2015; Scholz and Sicinski, 2015).8 Our access to detailed administrative data from the college pe-
riod allows us to control for the most widely recognized proxy for cognitive human capital at the
time of workforce entrance, college GPA, and we also take advantage of access to self-reported
measures of non-cognitive skills such as communication ability. While the exact interpretations
of estimated attractiveness effects will depend on whether these controls effectively eliminate
correlations between attractiveness and the unobservable in the wage equation, we stress that
our primary result - that the data are inconsistent with employer taste-based discrimination -
does not rely on whether this is the case.9
Of relevance for thinking about whether attractiveness is best viewed as just another pro-
ductive characteristic, we highlight a strong parallel between the manner in which attractiveness
influences wages and the manner in which GPA influences wages. The estimated predicted
change in wages from a one standard deviation change in attractiveness is larger than the esti-
mated predicted change in wages from a one standard deviation change in college GPA. Further,
we find that, like our attractiveness measure, the GPA premium is generated entirely by jobs in
which one would expect GPA to be productivity enhancing, that is jobs that specialize in high
skilled tasks. In sharp contrast, there exists no evidence of a GPA premium in jobs that specialize
6Related to models of employer learning (see, e.g., Farber and Gibbons, 1996, and Altonji and Pierret, 2001, this
type of insight helps motivate the examination of the long-run effects of attractiveness in Scholz and Sicinski (2015).
7Evaluating the net effects of a specific policy is further complicated if, has been argued, the presence of an
attractiveness premium can lead to negative psychological and physical health effects.
8In closely related research, Persico et al. (2004) find that the positive relationship between height and wages is
likely due to unobserved attributes that are cultivated by individuals who are tall when young.
9In contrast, whether controls effectively eliminate correlations between attractiveness and the unobservable is of
first order importance in research motivated by the fact that concerns about employer discrimination are alleviated if
the beauty premium is reduced/removed when controls are added.
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in low skilled tasks. Further evidence of GPA being a productivity enhancing attribute comes
from finding that high-GPA individuals are more likely than other workers to sort into jobs in
which they spend the most time on high skilled tasks.
2 Data
This section provides general information about the Berea Panel Study (Section 2.1), describes
how attractiveness is measured in the BPS (Section 2.2), and explains how the BPS job task
information is used to classify jobs by their skill level and degree of interaction with people and
information (Section 2.3).
2.1 The Berea Panel Study
Designed and administered by Todd Stinebrickner and Ralph Stinebrickner, the Berea Panel
Study (BPS) is a longitudinal survey that was initiated to provide detailed information about the
college and early post-college periods.10 The project involves surveying students who entered
Berea College in the fall of 2000 and the fall of 2001 approximately sixty times from the time
of college entrance through 2014. In this paper, we focus on understanding the evolution of
earnings for graduates, by taking advantage of post-college surveys that were collected annually
after students left school. More than ninety percent of all graduates in the two BPS entering
cohorts completed one or more of these annual surveys, and the response rate on these surveys
leveled off at slightly more than eighty percent. Our analysis uses all yearly observations from
the time of graduation until an individual first fails to complete a post-college survey. For the 506
individuals in our sample, the maximum number of yearly observations is 10 and the average
number of yearly observations is 6.2.
Berea College is unique in certain respects that have been discussed in previous work. For
example, the school focuses on providing educational opportunities to students from relatively
low income backgrounds. As has been noted in our previous work that has used the BPS to study
other issues and as discussed in our conclusions, it is necessary to be appropriately cautious
about the exact extent to which the results from our case study would generalize to graduates
10For previous work using the BPS to study outcomes in the college period, see, for example, Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner (2003b, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014).
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from other specific institutions. However, important for the notion that the basic lessons from
our work are pertinent for thinking about what takes place elsewhere, Berea operates under
a standard liberal arts curriculum, and the students at Berea are similar in academic quality
to, for example, students at the University of Kentucky (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2008).
In addition, academic decisions and outcomes at Berea are similar to those found elsewhere
(Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2003a, 2014). For example, dropout rates at Berea are similar
to dropout rates at other schools (for students from similar backgrounds) and patterns of major
choice and major-switching at Berea are similar to those found in the NLSY by Arcidiacono
(2004). Further, even putting aside the obvious issue of data collection feasibility, there are
benefits of studying one school. In particular, the ability to hold school quality constant is
beneficial for a variety of reasons, including that it makes academic measures such as college
GPA directly comparable across individuals. An additional virtue of our data collection is that it
allows us to examine individuals starting at the very beginning of their careers.11
This paper is made possible by merging the unique survey data from the early portion of
an individual’s working life with detailed administrative data from the college period, which
provides basic demographic information as well as academic information characterizing one’s
human capital at the time of workforce entrance. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics separately
for men and women in the BPS. Throughout the paper, we follow previous research on the labor
market returns to attractiveness by conducting our analyses separately by gender. However,
because Table 1 shows that almost two-thirds of our sample is female, the subsequent empirical
work focuses primarily on females. Nonetheless, while our analyses of men are hindered to
some extent by the smaller sample, we show that our main conclusions for females also apply
to men.12 Column 1 shows that, for females, the mean log hourly wage in 2005 dollars is 2.56,
and the average (std. deviation) of college GPA is 3.20 (0.44). Column 2 shows that, for males,
the mean log hourly wage in 2005 dollars is 2.63, and the average (std. deviation) of college GPA
is 3.08 (0.47). Table 1 also shows descriptive statistics for the attractiveness measure, which is
discussed in detail in Section 2.2, and the job task classification, which is defined in Section 2.3.
11In many respects, our general motivation for studying one school is similar in spirit to that in, for example,
Bertrand et al. (2010) who examine the earnings of a sample of MBA graduates from one top business school.
12As discussed in Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003b, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014), females make up a higher per-
centage of matriculants at Berea and a lower proportion of the students that drop out. It is worth noting that in
this sample of recent college graduates, the labor market experiences of males and females are similar across many
dimensions. For example, both men and women have high employment rates (91% men, 85% women).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Gender
(1) Women (2) Men
Log-wage 2.562 2.628
(0.613) (0.659)
Attractiveness 2.590 2.576
(0.779) (0.624)
College GPA 3.204 3.082
(0.443) (0.473)
High school GPA 3.538 3.352
(0.406) (0.466)
Family income 27.283 25.231
(19.553) (18.940)
Task Specialization
High skilled interpersonal 0.390 0.390
(0.488) (0.488)
Low skilled interpersonal 0.413 0.392
(0.493) (0.488)
High skilled information 0.183 0.287
(0.387) (0.453)
Low skilled information 0.159 0.182
(0.366) (0.386)
Observations 2,038 1,129
Individuals 324 182
Notes: Entries are means, with standard deviations in parentheses.
Family income measured in $10, 000.
2.2 Measuring Attractiveness
Each student’s attractiveness was assessed by 50 evaluators on the basis of a color student ID
picture, using a five point scale where: 5 = very attractive, 4 = above average, 3 = average, 2 =
below average, and 1 = significantly below average. Both oral and written instructions asked each
evaluator to first look through all of the 100 pictures that he/she was given and then to assign
a number taking into account that, “The number you write should represent how attractive you
think the person in the picture is relative to people in the other pictures you received.” Our
attractiveness measure is the average of the fifty assessments. The histograms in Figure 1 show
that the averages and medians of this measure for women and men are virtually identical, but
that attractiveness varies somewhat more between women than between men.
Our student-ID approach shares the virtues of the yearbook picture approach described in
Scholz and Sicinski (2015). In particular, they find that, as would be expected when variation in
assessments exists across evaluators, estimated effects of attractiveness tend to be larger when
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Figure 1: Distribution of Attractiveness by Gender
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one has the luxury of reducing measurement error by averaging assessments across multiple
reviewers. However, it is worth noting that the facial attractiveness measures in this paper and in
Scholz and Sicinski (2015) may have a slightly different interpretation than those in Hamermesh
and Biddle (1994), which are perhaps best viewed as a measure of overall beauty because they
come from a single in-person assessment of a survey collector.
2.3 Classifying Jobs Based on Tasks
As discussed in the introduction, identifying the subset of jobs where attractiveness is likely to en-
hance worker productivity is a natural way to distinguish between the employer taste-based dis-
crimination explanation and the productivity-based explanation for the attractiveness premium
(Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994). If a wage premium for attractiveness exists in all jobs—including
those where it seems implausible that physical attractiveness is truly a productive attribute—this
supports the employer discrimination hypothesis.
It seems reasonable to believe that attractiveness may enhance a worker’s productivity in per-
forming interpersonal tasks such as serving customers and negotiating (Hamermesh and Biddle,
1994). Conversely, it seems unlikely that attractiveness directly enhances productivity perform-
ing information tasks such as data entry or analyzing data, which are also very common among
college graduates. Unfortunately, past research has been forced to infer the degree of interper-
sonal interaction in a job on the basis of only occupation codes. As detailed in the introduction,
this may represent a critical limitation; measurement error arising from fundamental difficul-
9
ties in characterizing the importance of interpersonal tasks on a job may stack the deck in favor
of the employer taste-based discrimination explanation that has been found to be of primary
importance in past research.
We address this fundamental difficulty by taking advantage of access to direct, job-level mea-
sures of the amount of time spent performing interpersonal tasks and the amount of time spent
performing information tasks. Survey Question C.3 (Appendix A) elicits the percentage of total
work time that an individual spends on tasks in the general People category and the percentage
of total work time that an individual spends on tasks in the general Information category (as well
as the percentage spent on tasks in an Objects category). As shown in the Appendix, Questions
C.1 and C.2, respectively, elicit the time allocation measures that indicate the percentages of time
that are spent on each specific sub-task within the People and Information categories. Classify-
ing the first two sub-tasks (1 and 2) within each of the People (C.1) and Information (C.2) task
categories as low skilled and the last two sub-tasks (3 and 4) as high skilled, questions C.1, C.2,
and C.3 allow us to compute the percentage of total work time in a year that is spent on each of
the following four tasks: high skilled People, low skilled People, high skilled Information, and
low skilled Information. Stinebrickner et al. (2016) contains a detailed discussion of issues related
to survey design and provides evidence of the usefulness of the survey questions.
One could imagine a variety of ways that this task information could be used for our pur-
poses. We take an approach that is appealing in its simplicity. Specifically, we differentiate
between jobs on the basis of the primary task on the job, which is defined to be the task (from
the list high skilled People, low skilled People, high skilled Information, and low skilled Infor-
mation) in which a worker spends the most time. Table 1 shows that, pooling jobs in all years for
females, 39% of jobs have a primary task of high skilled People, 41% of jobs have a primary task
of low skilled People, 18% of jobs have a primary task of high skilled Information, and 16% of
jobs have a primary task of low skilled Information.13 The sum of the proportions is greater than
one in these descriptive statistics because, for the 14.5 percent of jobs where ties occur, a job is
assigned multiple primary tasks. For example, a woman who reports spending 50% of her time
13Given that C.3 elicits information about Objects and given that our survey contains a question about Objects (not
shown) that is analogous to C.2 and C.3, we are able to compute the percentage of time spent in high skilled and low
skilled Objects tasks. However, we find that, in our sample of female college graduates, only about 7 percent of all
jobs have a sole primary task of either high skilled Objects or low skilled Objects. Thus, for all jobs, the job’s primary
task is based on the maximum of high skilled People, low skilled People, high skilled Information and low skilled
Information.
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on both high and low skilled people tasks on a particular job would be classified as specializing
in both of these tasks.14
3 Empirical Results
For our primary sample of women, we begin in Section 3.1 by presenting evidence of large wage
returns to attractiveness. Section 3.2 demonstrates that attractive individuals tend to sort into
jobs that involve a large amount of interpersonal tasks. Inconsistent with an important role
for employer taste-based discrimination, Section 3.3 shows that attractive workers earn higher
wages only in jobs where attractiveness is plausibly a productive attribute - those that involve a
large amount of interpersonal tasks. Section 3.4 discusses the potential alternatives to employer
taste-based discrimination.
3.1 Wages and Attractiveness
Pooling all female observations across all sample years, Column 1 of Table 2 shows the results
obtained from regressing log wages on age and our attractiveness measure, which has been
normalized to have a standard deviation of one.15 Consistent with previous research, we find
a large, statistically significant coefficient on the attractiveness measure. Specifically, increasing
attractiveness by one sample standard deviation (0.78 on the five-point scale) is associated with
a 7.8% increase in wages, with the associated t-statistic having a value of 3.55.
A question that has received attention in the literature is whether an observed relationship
between attractiveness and wages can be interpreted as a “causal” effect of attractiveness per
se. This question represents a good starting point given our objectives because concerns about
employer taste-based discrimination would be largely irrelevant if attractiveness only appears
to affect wages due to a correlation between attractiveness and omitted productivity-enhancing
14Motivated by work such as Sanders and Taber (2012), who note that the primary usefulness of categorizing jobs
by occupation is that occupations serve as observable proxies for the true task requirements of jobs, the BPS did not
have a focus on creating standard occupational codes. As a result, the empirical analysis in the remainder of the paper
focuses solely on this direct, task based method of classifying jobs.
15Neal and Johnson (1996) and Persico et al. (2004), along with Heckman (1998), argue against controlling for
potentially endogenous variables, such as work experience, when estimating the effects of discrimination. However,
in part because the large majority of women are working in each year, the results in this section change very little if
the model is estimated using actual experience rather than age. Neal and Johnson (1996) study the black-white wage
gap using a parsimonious wage regression that includes a measure of skills (AFQT). Persico et al. (2004) investigate
whether wage differentials between tall and short adults can be attributed to discrimination, or a number of alternative
explanations.
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Table 2: Regression of Log-Wage on Attractiveness for Women
Specifications
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Attractiveness (standardized) 0.078 0.071 0.070 0.055 0.054 0.073
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022)
College GPA (standardized) 0.053 0.055 0.048 0.054 0.057 0.049 0.050
(0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021)
High School GPA 0.011
(0.069)
Family income 0.010
(0.012)
Attractiveness (categorical)
Second quartile 0.063 0.060
(0.059) (0.057)
Third quartile 0.102 0.101
(0.062) (0.061)
Fourth quartile 0.181 0.183
(0.067) (0.066)
Self-Rated Skills
Communication top 25% 0.089
(0.038)
Personality top 25% -0.033
(0.045)
Relateability top 25% 0.003
(0.040)
Task Specialization
High skilled people 0.053 0.055
(0.042) (0.043)
Low skilled people -0.042 -0.040
(0.041) (0.041)
High skilled information 0.171 0.171
(0.044) (0.045)
R2 0.045 0.053 0.051 0.054 0.034 0.029 0.068 0.066
Observations 2,037 2,037 2,037 2,028 1,517 1,517 2,037 2,037
Notes: Regressions also include a constant and age. Attractiveness and College GPA are standarized to have a mean
equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to one. Log-wages are in 2005 dollars. Family income is measured in
$10, 000. Standard errors are clustered by individual.
variables. One prominent concern is that a worker’s attractiveness may be related in some way
to her cognitive human capital (Scholz and Sicinski, 2015). College GPA has been widely rec-
ognized as a leading proxy for one’s human capital at the time of entrance to the labor market,
and, because our study involves one school, also has the virtue in our context of being directly
comparable across the students. Column 2 of Table 2 shows that adding College GPA to the wage
regression has little effect on the estimated effect of attractiveness; the estimate falls from 0.078
to 0.071, reflecting the existence of a relatively small, positive correlation between college GPA
and attractiveness. Access to the GPA measure is also beneficial because it provides a benchmark
against which the importance of attractiveness can be compared. The (normalized) GPA estimate
indicates that increasing GPA by one sample standard deviation (0.44 GPA points) is associated
with a wage increase of 5.3 percent (t-statistic of 2.41), somewhat smaller than the estimated wage
increase of 7.1 percent associated with a one standard deviation increase in attractiveness.
While the detailed administrative data contain a variety of other measures that may be related
to human capital, the conceptual motivation for controlling for these measures is not particularly
strong if, for example, the wage influence of a variable such as high school GPA comes through
its effect on college GPA. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, in Column 4 we add high school
GPA and family income to the specification in Column 2. As expected given that the specification
also contains college GPA, we find that neither of these variables are statistically significant at
conventional levels and that the effect of attractiveness remains substantively unchanged (0.070
from 0.071). Similar results are found if the ACT college entrance exam score is included in place
of high school GPA or if both of these variables are included together.16
In terms of other potentially important sources of omitted variables bias, it has been recog-
nized that attractiveness or other physical features may be related to non-cognitive skills such as
one’s communication ability (Feingold, 1992). Self-reported non-cognitive measures are available
for 78% of our person-year observations. Turning to Column 5, we find some evidence that non-
cognitive skills influence wages. In particular, students who report having communication skills
in the top 25% of Berea graduates have wages that are 8.9 percent higher than other students,
with the associated t-statistic having a value of slightly more than two. However, comparing the
16Given the strong correlation between high school GPA and ACT, interpretation of coefficients is perhaps difficult
when both variables are included. Regardless, the coefficient on attractiveness is 0.067 when ACT is added by itself
to the specification in Column 4 and is 0.068 when both variables are added to the specification in Column 4. The
estimated effects of high school GPA and ACT are not significant in either of these specifications.
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attractiveness coefficient in Column 5 to the attractiveness coefficient in Column 6, which is ob-
tained by estimating the specification in Column 2 for the smaller sample available in Column 5,
reveals that the addition of non-cognitive skills produces a change of only 0.001 in the estimated
effect of attractiveness. Even though self-reported communication skills are positively related to
wages, their inclusion in the wage regression does not lead to any appreciable attenuation of the
estimated effect of attractiveness.
Thus, Columns 4 and 5 indicate that adding other measures of cognitive human capital or
adding available measures of non-cognitive skills has very little effect on the estimated effect of
attractiveness. Given our desire to keep our sample as large as possible and given the concep-
tual/interpretation issues that arise when measures such as high school GPA and ACT are added
to a specification that also includes college GPA, in the remainder of the paper we focus on the
parsimonious specification shown in Column 2. We stress that our approach for examining the
importance of employer taste-based discrimination in Section 3.3 - which involves concluding
that there does not exist evidence of employer taste-based discrimination if attractiveness leads
to higher wages only in jobs where the presence of substantial interpersonal interactions pro-
vides an opportunity for attractiveness to potentially enhance productivity - does not rely on
establishing that attractiveness is uncorrelated with all other unobserved wage-influencing char-
acteristics. Indeed, if uncertainty is present about whether this type of correlation exists, it would
only make it difficult to know whether, for example, higher wages for attractive workers in jobs
with substantial amounts of interpersonal interaction are due to attractiveness per se or are due
to other unobserved characteristics that are correlated with attractiveness.
To conclude our current discussion of Table 2, the third column reports a specification that re-
laxes the linearity assumption for attractiveness by including indicator variables for attractiveness
quartiles. There is relatively little evidence of strong non-linear effects. The wages of individuals
in the second, third, and fourth quartiles are 6.3%, 10%, and 18.1%, respectively, higher than
individuals in the lowest attractiveness quartile (t-statistics of 1.07, 1.65, and 2.70, respectively).
3.2 Sorting into Job Tasks on the Basis of Attractiveness
Section 3.2.1 examines whether sorting into tasks is present on the basis of attractiveness. Sec-
tion 3.2.2 examines the implications of the findings in Section 3.2.1 for our investigation of the
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importance of employer taste-based discrimination.
3.2.1 Empirical Models of Sorting
We find strong evidence that attractive individuals tend to sort into jobs that require more People
tasks. Table 3 shows estimates of two probit specifications where the binary dependent variable
is defined to have a value of one if a worker’s primary job task is either high skilled People
or low skilled People (so that it has a value of zero if the primary task is either high skilled
Information or low skilled Information).17 The estimates of the marginal effects in column 1 show
that increasing attractiveness by one standard deviation increases the probability of having a
primary task of People by 0.053, with the associated t-statistic having a value of approximately 5.
Column 2, which allows attractiveness to enter non-linearly, shows that much of the attractiveness
effect in Column 1 arises due to the strong sorting of highly attractive people into jobs that
specialize in interpersonal tasks. Specifically, being in the top attractiveness quartile increases
the probability of having a primary task of People by 0.122 relative to individuals in the bottom
attractiveness quartile, with the associated t-statistic again having a value of close to five.
The strong influence of attractiveness on whether or not a person holds a job with a substan-
tial amount of interpersonal tasks is also apparent in Table 4, which shows results from a multi-
nomial probit model that distinguishes between the four primary-task outcomes: high skilled
People, low skilled People, high skilled Information, and low skilled Information. Specification
(A), shown in columns 1-3, allows attractiveness to enter the model linearly. The estimated coef-
ficients on attractiveness (t-statistics) for the high and low skilled People tasks, respectively, are
0.23 (4.24) and 0.17 (3.05). With low skilled Information specified as the base case, these estimates
indicate that attractive individuals are more likely to choose to work in both high skilled People
jobs and in low skilled People jobs than in low skilled Information jobs. Examining whether
attractive individuals are more likely to choose to work in high skilled People jobs and/or in low
skilled People jobs than in high skilled Information jobs requires differencing the coefficients in
the first two columns from the coefficient in the third column. The differences of 0.144 and 0.083
have associated p-values of 0.005 and 0.105, respectively. Our results based on direct measures
of the task content of jobs seemingly represent the strongest and most consistent evidence found
17All of the discrete choice models estimated in this section exclude observations where there are ties in the task
time-use amounts that determine the primary task.
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Table 3: Probit Models of Sorting into Interpersonal Job Tasks for Women
Specifications
Variable (Marginal Effects) (1) (2)
Attractiveness (standardized) 0.053
(0.010)
College GPA (standardized) -0.043 -0.042
(0.011) (0.011)
Attractiveness (categorical)
Second quartile -0.015
(0.028)
Third quartile 0.044
(0.027)
Fourth quartile 0.122
(0.025)
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.023
Observations 1,698 1,698
Notes: Binary dependent variable = 1 if the job specializes
in People tasks. Coefficients are marginal effects. The sam-
ple consists of women. Models also include a constant and
age.
to date that individuals systematically sort into jobs based on attractiveness.18
Specification (B) in Table 4, which allows attractiveness to enter the model through quartile
dummy variables, shows that sorting into People tasks is driven, to a large extent, by very
attractive individuals. With the low skilled Information category again specified as the base
case, the estimates show that being in the top quartile of attractiveness significantly increases the
“value” of both the high and low skilled People options relative to the low skilled Information
option (t-stats of 3.71 and 2.89, respectively). Examining whether very attractive individuals are
more likely to choose to work in high skilled People jobs and/or in low skilled People jobs than
in high skilled Information jobs requires differencing the fourth quartile coefficients in the fourth
and fifth columns from the fourth quartile coefficient in the sixth column. The differences of
0.298 and 0.170 have associated p-values of 0.045 and 0.257, respectively.
As a bit of an aside, we note that, paralleling the sorting by attractiveness, there is some
evidence that high GPA individuals sort into jobs that involve high skilled tasks. For example,
differencing the college GPA coefficients in the first column and the third column, respectively,
18Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) find some evidence consistent with the notion that workers sort across occupations
based on beauty. In their study of lawyers, Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) find evidence that attractive lawyers are
more likely to work in private sector jobs.
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Table 4: Multinomial Probit Models of Jointly Sorting into Job Tasks and Skill Levels for Women
Specifications
(A) Linear Attractiveness (B) Categorical Attractiveness
Task People Information People Information
Skill Level High Low High High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attractiveness (standardized) 0.229 0.168 0.085
(0.054) (0.055) (0.061)
College GPA (standardized) 0.045 -0.172 0.042 0.045 -0.172 0.045
(0.053) (0.053) (0.058) (0.053) (0.053) (0.058)
Attractiveness
Second quartile -0.125 0.018 0.026
(0.144) (0.142) (0.159)
Third quartile 0.180 0.093 0.200
(0.148) (0.148) (0.163)
Fourth quartile 0.587 0.459 0.289
(0.158) (0.159) (0.177)
Observations 1,799
Notes: The omitted category is low skilled Information. The sample consists of women. Models also
include a constant and age.
from the college GPA coefficient in the second column indicates that high-GPA workers are
substantially more likely to work in both high skilled People and high skilled Information jobs
than in low skilled People jobs. The p-values for the tests that the difference equals zero are both
less than 0.01.
The results from the two multinomial probit specifications confirm our prior finding from
the binary probit models that attractive individuals tend to sort into jobs that involve substantial
amounts of interpersonal interaction. The multinomial aspect of the model is important because
it helps bolster the conclusion that the observed sorting arises because of issues related to People
tasks per se. Specifically, knowing that the sorting into People jobs on the basis of attractiveness
remains even when we explicitly differentiate between high and low skilled tasks implies that the
attractiveness results in Table 3 are not simply a byproduct of attractive workers sorting into high-
skilled jobs. Sufficient for generating this conclusion, Table 4 finds no evidence that attractive
workers tend to sort into high skilled jobs; statistical tests reveal no evidence of a difference
between the attractiveness coefficients for high skilled People (column 1) and low skilled People
(column 2) and also reveal no evidence of a difference between the attractiveness coefficients for
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high skilled Information (column 3) and low skilled Information (which is normalized to zero).
3.2.2 Implications of Sorting
The implications of the sorting observed in Section 3.2.1 depend critically on the extent to which
this sorting explains the attractiveness premium. If the attractiveness premium arises primarily
because of differences in job tasks between attractive workers and other workers (sorting), then
obtaining an understanding of the underlying reasons for the attractiveness premium requires
focusing intently on why sorting is present. In contrast, if differences in job tasks between
attractive workers and other workers explain little of the attractiveness premium, then obtaining
an understanding of the underlying reasons for the attractiveness premium requires obtaining an
understanding of why, for at least some subset of job tasks, attractive individuals receive higher
wages than other individuals.
The extent to which sorting explains the attractiveness premium is an empirical question.
Importantly, the observed sorting of attractive workers into jobs that involve a substantial amount
of People tasks, but not a disproportionate amount of high skilled tasks, can only help explain
the attractiveness premium if these types of tasks tend be highly paid. To examine this issue,
Column 7 of Table 2 adds indicator variables describing whether a worker’s primary task is
high skilled Information, high skilled People, or low skilled People. The estimates indicate that
there exist important wage differences across the primary tasks. Of particular relevance for our
analysis, with low skilled Information as the omitted category, the wage order of the primary
tasks (from highest wage to lowest wage) is: high skilled Information, high skilled People, low
skilled Information, low skilled People.19 Then, when attractive workers sort disproportionately
into jobs that involve substantial amounts of interpersonal interaction, they are not systematically
moving into job tasks that tend to be most highly compensated. As such, it is not surprising that
a comparison of the attractiveness coefficients in Column 7 and Column 2 of Table 2 reveals that
adding primary tasks to the wage regression has no effect on the attractiveness coefficient. A
similar result is seen by comparing Column 3 and Column 8, which adds primary tasks to the
specification in Column 3.
More generally, as noted in the first paragraph of this subsection, the results underscore the
19This is consistent with the findings in Stinebrickner et al. (2016).
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necessity of obtaining an understanding of why, for at least some subset of job tasks, attractive
individuals receive higher wages than other individuals. The results here suggest a potential
explanation. Why might attractive individuals sort into People tasks when, for the sample as
a whole, these tasks do not pay more than Information tasks? One possibility is that attractive
workers have a comparative advantage in People tasks because attractiveness is a productive
attribute in these tasks but not in Information tasks. This motivates us, in Section 3.3, to look for
evidence in support of this explanation by examining whether attractive workers receive higher
wages in all jobs or only in People jobs, where it has been hypothesized that attractiveness is
potentially productive.
3.3 Employer Discrimination in Wages on the Basis of Attractiveness
The fact that the attractiveness premium is not explained by differences in job tasks between
attractive workers and other workers implies that, for at least some subset of job tasks, attractive
workers receive higher wages than other workers. In this section we take advantage of our unique
data to identify the set of tasks where this is the case, in order to provide evidence about the
presence of employer taste-based discrimination. Our test is based on the insight that employer
taste-based discrimination would tend to produce attractiveness premiums across all types of
jobs, while a worker productivity-based explanation would produce attractiveness premiums in
only a subset of jobs: those jobs where the presence of substantial interpersonal interactions
provides an opportunity for attractiveness to potentially enhance worker productivity.
We operationalize our test by estimating wage regressions after stratifying our sample into
four groups on the basis of jobs’ primary tasks, two groups where the primary task involves
interpersonal interactions (high skilled People and low skilled People) and two groups where the
primary task does not involve interpersonal interactions (high skilled Information and low skilled
Information). Table 5 shows wage equation estimates for our linear attractiveness specification
from column 2 of Table 2. Providing very strong evidence that the attractiveness premium should
not be attributed to an employer taste-based explanation, the results show that attractiveness has
a strong effect on wages in jobs that specialize in People tasks, but not in jobs that specialize
in Information tasks. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in attractiveness leads to
a 9.7% wage increase in high skilled People jobs (column 1) and a 9.3% wage increase in low
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Table 5: Log-Wage Regressions by Primary Job Task and Skill Level for Women: Linear Attrac-
tiveness Specification
Primary Job Task (A) People (B) Information
Skill Level High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Attractiveness (standardized) 0.097 0.093 0.011 -0.039
(0.025) (0.029) (0.045) (0.047)
College GPA (standardized) 0.090 0.034 0.064 0.023
(0.031) (0.033) (0.035) (0.048)
R2 0.064 0.064 0.038 0.043
Observations 804 832 375 322
Notes: Attractiveness and College GPA are standardized to have a mean of zero and
standard deviation of one. Regressions include a constant and age. Standard errors are
clustered by individual.
skilled people jobs (column 2). The associated t-statistics are each greater than three. In sharp
contrast to the large wage premia in People jobs, columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 show no evidence
of an attractiveness premium in Information jobs. Namely, the coefficients on attractiveness for
high and low skilled Information jobs are 0.011 and -0.039, and neither parameter is statistically
significant (t-statistics of 0.24 and -0.83).20
A very similar story appears in Table 6, which shows the stratified results using the non-linear
specification from Column 3 of Table 2. For example, for workers with a primary task of high
(low) skilled People, Column 1 (Column 2) shows that being in the top attractiveness quartile
leads to a 23.5% (21.3%) increase in wages relative to the bottom attractiveness quartile, with the
associated t-statistic having a value of 3.13 (2.29). However, for workers with a primary task of
high (low) skilled Information, Column 3 (Column 4) shows that being in the top attractiveness
quartile leads to a 5.8% (-5.0%) increase in wages relative to the bottom attractiveness quartile,
with the associated t-statistic having a value of only 0.42 (-0.36).
It is useful to contrast our strong empirical evidence of systematic variation in the attractive-
ness premium based on direct measures of job tasks to the results obtained in studies that, by
necessity, rely on standard occupation classifications to identify jobs where attractiveness may
enhance productivity. Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) find evidence that the beauty premium
exists across all occupations, based on several methods of identifying occupations where beauty
20Appendix B shows that these results are robust to classifying jobs into task categories based on whether or not
time spent on each task is above the median.
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Table 6: Log-Wage Regressions by Primary Job Task and Skill Level for Women: Categorical
Attractiveness Specification
Primary Job Task (A) People (B) Information
Skill Level High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Attractiveness
Second quartile -0.014 0.080 0.009 0.180
(0.084) (0.088) (0.090) (0.091)
Third quartile 0.142 0.120 0.024 -0.092
(0.072) (0.092) (0.111) (0.135)
Fourth quartile 0.235 0.213 0.058 -0.050
(0.075) (0.093) (0.136) (0.137)
College GPA (standardized) 0.089 0.038 0.062 0.016
(0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.047)
R2 0.067 0.057 0.039 0.070
Observations 804 832 375 322
Notes: College GPA is standardized to have a mean of zero and standard
deviation of one. Regressions include a constant and age. Standard errors are
clustered by individual.
is likely to be valued. Robins et al. (2011) base their classification of jobs on the Occupational
Information Network (O*NET) database, and also find that the beauty premium appears to span
all occupations.21 In fact, the authors find that that the beauty premium is actually larger in oc-
cupations where, a priori, one would not expect beauty to be valued. Most recently, Scholz and
Sicinski (2015) find evidence of a robust beauty premium across all occupations, based on the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles. In contrast, using our direct measure of time spent on job tasks,
we find that the attractiveness premium is only present in jobs that specialize in interpersonal
tasks. These results, to our knowledge, provide the strongest existing evidence contradicting the
hypothesis that employer discrimination is the primary source of the attractiveness premium.
More broadly, these findings are consistent with a rapidly growing literature which shows, in
other contexts, that direct measures of job tasks lead to new insights that are difficult to obtain
using standard occupation classifications.22
Our findings suggest that perhaps attractiveness should be viewed in the same way as other
21The O*NET database is an updated version of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). The data contain
detailed information about occupations.
22To give just one example, a number of papers have employed task-based approaches to investigate changes in
the wage structure and job polarization. See, for example Autor et al. (2003), Autor et al. (2009), and Autor and Dorn
(2013).
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attributes that are widely accepted as having an influence on a worker’s productivity. This
notion is further bolstered by evidence of strong parallels in Tables 5 and Table 6 between one
such attribute, college GPA, and attractiveness. The results show that GPA has a significant
wage effect in jobs with substantial amounts of high skilled tasks (where GPA is likely to be
most productive), but not in jobs with substantial amounts of low skilled tasks (where GPA is
likely to be less productive). Specifically, for workers with a primary task of high skilled People
(Information), Column 1 (Column 3) of Table 5 shows that a one standard deviation increase in
GPA leads to a 9.0% (6.4%) increase in wages, with the associated t-statistic having a value of 2.90
(1.82). However, for workers with a primary task of low skilled People (Information), Column 2
(Column 4) shows that a one standard deviation increase in GPA leads to a 3.8% (1.6%) increase
in wages, with the associated t-statistic having a value of 1.15 (0.34). If anything, evidence of
wage differences across task categories for which productivity differences were expected a priori
is even stronger for attractiveness than for GPA.23
3.4 Exploring Alternatives to Employer Discrimination
The results in Section 3.3 provide strong evidence that our wage data are not consistent with an
employer taste-based discrimination explanation. Instead, attractive individuals are paid more
only in jobs where attractiveness is potentially productive. Similarly, our results related to sort-
ing in Section 3.2 are also seemingly inconsistent with employer taste-based discrimination in
hiring. In the presence of employer discrimination, attractive individuals would be expected, by
definition, to obtain jobs with more lucrative tasks. Instead, we see attractive individuals sorting
into People jobs, which tend to pay less than Information jobs. In terms of alternative expla-
nations that could generate the sorting of attractive individuals into People jobs, one possibility
is that attractive workers simply have a preference for jobs that involve substantial amounts of
interpersonal interaction. However, given the results in Section 3.3, what appears more likely is
that attractive individuals are choosing to sort into People jobs because these are the jobs where
their attractiveness is productive, and therefore leads to higher wages.
Thus, both our sorting results in Section 3.2 and our wage results in Section 3.3 are consistent
with a productivity-based explanation. In terms of alternatives to this explanation, it is difficult,
23This might be caused by GPA having some productivity benefits in low skilled tasks, while attractiveness is
unlikely to have any productivity benefits in tasks that do not involve interpersonal interactions.
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even from a conceptual standpoint, to distinguish between a productivity-based explanation
and a customer taste-based discrimination explanation. To help fix ideas, consider a standard
textbook-type example in which a customer is willing to pay more to interact with an attractive
waiter/waitress. This preference might be viewed as productivity-based if the attractiveness
leads to more efficient employee/customer interactions which help a customer arrive at the best
possible food order. On the other hand, this preference might be viewed as customer taste-based
discrimination if attractiveness does not influence the customer’s order, but the customer simply
enjoys looking at a more attractive employee.
The existence of only fairly nuanced differences between the two scenarios in the example
highlight why it will always be difficult to conclusively distinguish between the customer dis-
crimination and productivity-based explanations (Hamermesh and Parker, 2005), and we stress
that making such a distinction is not the primary objective of this paper. Nonetheless, given the
nature of our data, it seems worthwhile to provide some further discussion about how one might
attempt to probe a little into this issue. An empirical attempt to differentiate between the two
explanations might posit that the latter (productivity-based) channel, if important, would affect
wages across a wide range of interpersonal job tasks, while the former (customer discrimina-
tion) channel would only affect wages in jobs that involve directly interacting with consumers.
In our data, low skilled People jobs are largely defined to have tasks that involve interacting
with consumers (e.g., serving customers or sales), while high skilled People jobs are largely de-
fined to have tasks that involve interacting with other employees within the firm (supervising or
exchanging ideas/negotiating). Then, under the posited assumption, our finding that the attrac-
tiveness premium is virtually identical for high skilled People jobs as it is for low skilled People
jobs might be viewed as suggestive evidence that, at the very least, not all of the attractiveness
premium is arising due to customer taste-based discrimination.24
24This finding that a robust wage premium exists across different interpersonal tasks that might be expected to have
substantially different amounts of direct exposure to consumers is seen even when we further dis-aggregate People
tasks. Specifically, when we estimate our linear specification from column 2 of Table 2 for the four skill sub-tasks
in Question C.1, the estimated effect (standard error) of attractiveness is 0.082 (0.029) for subtask 1, 0.085 (0.058) for
subtask 2, 0.092 (0.026) for subtask 3, and 0.053 (0.043) for subtask 4. Combining males and females to increase sample
sizes, the estimated effects (standard error) of attractiveness 0.072 (0.022) for subtask 1, 0.069 (0.043) for subtask 2,
0.067. (0.023) for subtask 3, and 0.063 (0.031) for subtask 4.
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Table 7: Log-Wage Regressions by Primary Job Task for Men and Women
Gender (A) Men (B) Women
Primary Job Task People Information Both People Information Both
Skill Level Both Both High Low Both Both High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Attractiveness (std.) 0.068 -0.024 0.021 0.035 0.097 -0.008 0.070 0.065
(0.028) (0.037) (0.029) (0.032) (0.022) (0.037) (0.025) (0.028)
College GPA (std.) 0.050 0.063 0.093 0.011 0.056 0.047 0.077 0.028
(0.035) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035) (0.024) (0.031) (0.026) (0.031)
R2 0.061 0.122 0.068 0.062 0.067 0.040 0.050 0.050
Observations 767 422 715 606 1,501 623 1,131 1,106
Notes: Attractiveness and College GPA are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one within
each gender. Models also include a constant and age. Standard errors are clustered by individual.
4 The Relationship between Attractiveness and Wages for Men
The primary focus on women in the paper is motivated by the fact that our data contain only half
as many person-year observations for men. Nonetheless, in this section we show that the main
result from Section 3 - that, inconsistent with an employer discrimination explanation, attractive-
ness is positively related to wages only in jobs where substantial interpersonal interactions take
place - is also true for men. While the larger sample of women gave us the luxury of differ-
entiating between high and low skill levels within the People and Information task categories,
this is not a crucial conceptual distinction for our primary objectives. Moreover, Section 3 found
strong similarities in the effects of attractiveness by skill level (high or low) for women. For our
examination of the role of attractiveness for men in this section, these considerations motivate
us to aggregate: 1) the high skilled People primary task category and the low skilled People
primary task category into a single overall People category and 2) the high skilled Information
primary task category and the low skilled Information primary task category into a single overall
Information category.
The first two columns of Table 7 show the attractiveness results for men using the linear
attractiveness specification. The results show the same role for attractiveness as was found earlier
for women. For workers with a primary task of (either high or low) People, Column 1 shows that
a one standard deviation increase in attractiveness leads to a 6.8% increase in wages, with the
associated t-statistic having a value of 2.42. However, for workers with a primary task of (either
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high or low) Information, Column 2 shows that the estimated effect has a slightly negative value
of -0.024 (t-statistic -0.65).
Analogously, to examine the results related to GPA, we aggregate 1) the high skilled People
primary task category and the high skilled Information primary task category into a single overall
High-Skilled category and 2) the low skilled Information primary task category and the low
skilled People primary task category into a single overall Low-Skilled category. The results in
Column 3 and Column 4, which use these aggregated categories, are consistent with the earlier
GPA results for women. For workers with a High-Skilled primary task (where GPA is likely to be
most productive), Column 3 shows that a one standard deviation increase in GPA leads to a 9.3%
increase in wages, with the associated t-statistic having a value of 2.66. However, for workers
with a Low-Skilled primary task (where GPA is likely to be less productive), Column 4 shows
that the estimated effect is only 0.011 (t-statistic 0.31).
For comparison purposes, the final four columns of Table 7 present the aggregated-task re-
sults for women. When comparing the female and male results, it is useful to remember that
attractiveness is standardized separately by gender so that the standardized measure is mean
zero with a standard deviation of one for each gender. Standardizing both the male results and
the female results instead by the overall (pooled) mean and standard deviation makes it easier
to directly compare the magnitude of the estimates between genders. When attractiveness is
standardized in this manner, the attractiveness coefficient estimates (t-statistics) for People jobs
are 0.079 (2.38) and 0.090 (4.41) for men and women, respectively.25
5 Conclusion
Our approach to examining the role that employer taste-based discrimination plays in the de-
termination of the attractiveness wage premium is based on the insight that such discrimination
would tend to produce premiums across all types of jobs, while a worker productivity-based
explanation would produce premiums in only a subset of jobs: those where the presence of
substantial interpersonal interactions provides an opportunity for attractiveness to potentially
25As would be expected, standardizing the variables in this slightly different way does not alter the finding that
the attractiveness coefficient estimates in Information jobs are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant at
standard levels. Specifically, the estimates (with t-statistics in parentheses) for Information jobs are -0.028 (-0.66) and
-0.007 (-0.22) for men and women.
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enhance worker productivity. Unfortunately, past efforts to take full advantage of this concep-
tually appealing approach may have been undermined to some extent by unavoidable empirical
difficulties. Perhaps most prominently, it may be challenging using traditional data sources to
accurately characterize the importance of interpersonal interactions on jobs. Notably, a burgeon-
ing recent literature interested in using explicit measures of job tasks to provide new insight
into a variety of labor market topics has raised awareness of the substantial measurement error
that may be present when job tasks are characterized using information from (occupation-level)
sources such as the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.
Measurement error in tasks is particularly worrisome in the attractiveness context; the nature
of the approach described above implies that its presence would tend to stack the deck in favor
of finding evidence of employer taste-based discrimination. Our reexamination of the role of
employer taste-based discrimination in this paper is motivated by the raised awareness of issues
related to task measurement, along with our collection of longitudinal task data that directly
address the limitations of traditional data. In particular, our data represent the first longitudinal
data that characterize tasks at the level of individual jobs (rather than at the level of occupations)
and also contain explicit time-allocation measures. Together, these features allow us to observe
exactly how much time individuals spend on high skilled People tasks and low skilled People
tasks in each year of work.
Our conclusion that the data are inconsistent with a primary role for employer taste-based
discrimination stands in direct contrast to all previous work that takes advantage of similar
conceptual approaches. For a variety of reasons, including the reality that our study involves
one school, it seems most warranted to draw attention to the general message of our work - that
conclusions about the importance of employer taste-based discrimination in this context may
depend critically on a researcher’s ability to characterize the tasks performed on a job. However,
new initiatives to collect task data that share some virtues of our unique task data may make
it possible in the future to compare our estimates to those obtained using samples from wider
populations.
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Appendix A: Job Task Survey Questions
Question C: How does your JOB1 require you to relate to PEOPLE and INFORMATION?
• Question C1: Below are 4 ways that you may interact with PEOPLE on a job.
1. Following instructions from others such as supervisors or directly serving the needs
of customers or animals.
2. Persuading others about a company product/service or point of view (e.g. sales) or
entertaining others.
3. Supervising others or instructing/teaching others.
4. Exchanging ideas/information/opinions or negotiating with others to make decisions
or formulate policies.
– Think about the TOTAL time that you spend interacting with PEOPLE as part of your
JOB1. Indicate what percentage of the total time is spent interacting in each of the four
ways. Note: Each percentage should be between 0 (the item plays no role) and 100 (all
interactions are from the one item) and the four items should sum to 100.
• Question C2: Below are 4 ways that you may interact with INFORMATION on a job.
1. Entering data; typing documents written by others; posting information etc.
2. Gathering or classifying information/data and performing simple calculations using
data.
3. Analyzing data/information
4. Using data analysis done by yourself/others to develop knowledge/solutions and
make important decisions.
– Think about the TOTAL time that you spend interacting with INFORMATION as
part of your JOB1. Indicate what percentage of the total time is spent interacting in
each of the four ways. Note: Each percentage should be between 0 (the item plays no
role) and 100 (all interactions are from the one item) and the four items should sum
to 100.
• Question C3: Now think about your TOTAL job responsibilities on your JOB1. Indicate the
percentage of your responsibilities that involve interacting with PEOPLE, INFORMATION,
and OBJECTS, respectively. Each percentage should be between 0 and 100 and the three
percentages should sum to one.
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Appendix B: Wage Regression when Jobs are Classified Based on
Median Tasks
The wage regression below is a robustness check for the estimates shown in Table 5 that
uses a different method to classify jobs based on tasks. In this version, jobs are classified into
each task category (high skilled People, low skilled People, high skilled Information, low skilled
Information) if the time spent on a particular task is above the median. For reference, the median
fractions of time are as follows: high skilled People 0.21, low skilled People 0.14, high skilled
Information 0.15, low skilled Information 0.15. If a particular observation has above median
time spent on more than one task, the observation will enter into more than one regression. For
example, a job that requires 0.22 high skilled People and 0.14 low skilled People will enter into
the regressions in columns (1) and (2).
Table 8: Log-Wage Regressions for Women: Jobs Classified based on Median Tasks
Primary Job Task (A) People (B) Information
Skill Level High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Attractiveness (standardized) 0.074 0.088 0.040 0.015
(0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
College GPA (standardized) 0.082 0.042 0.062 0.035
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
R2 0.053 0.052 0.049 0.043
Observations 1,022 1,028 1,055 1,063
Notes: Observations are assigned to each task category if the task is above the
median level. For example, an observation is included in the Column 1 regression if
time spent on high skilled People tasks is above the median value for women of 0.21.
Notes: Attractiveness and College GPA are standardized to have a mean of zero and
standard deviation of one. Regressions include a constant and age. Standard errors are
clustered by individual.
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